Abstract. In order to understand economic growth and distribution one should not primarily look for models concerned with equilibrium, but for a classical model -a model in which the profit rate is the central variable. In capitalism, capital accumulation and growth depend on the profit rate, and the functional distribution of income is determined by it -together with the type of technical progress. In this paper the author presents a revised classical model of growth. It is revised because it inverts the classical model, making the rate of profit the constant in the long run, not for market reasons but because the capitalist system will build the necessary institutions to restore the profit rate whenever it falls; and because the wage rate is treated as the residuum, tending to grow with productivity. Given the existence of three types of technological progress (capital using or mechanization, neutral, and capital saving), the author shows how, in the process of economic growth the profit rate, the wage rate, and the functional distribution of income vary in the historical process of growth -a process in which it is possible to identify historical stylized stages.
and in the functional distribution of income between wages and profits, and gives the required attention to the institutional aspects of the process. Yet, it was abandoned by most economists, probably because it is based in an assumption that proved not realistic -that the wage rate is constant or corresponds to the historical cost of labor reproduction. This paper aims to restore the classical model of growth by inverting the assumptions about the determinant and the residuum variable, and by introducing three types of technical progress.
The two basic growth models in modern economics -the Harrod-Domar model and the Solow model -adopt production functions establishing relations between capital, labor, technical progress, and economic growth. Although they apparently have as objective to discover the causes of economic growth, their original central concern is not that but to develop a model either consistent with Keynesian assumption that no equilibrium is assured by the market, or with neoclassical opposite assumption. Although this discussion may be interesting, it does not add new information to an obvious fact: capitalist economic growth does not follow an equilibrium path, but this does not mean that such equilibrium is of the razor's edge type. Although instable, growth has been quite sustained since the capitalist and industrial revolution, but it never took place just as an outcome of market forces. State defined institutions and policies always played a key role. On the other hand, the Solow model is attractive to many economists because the production functions are an adequate tool for econometric research. Yet, models come almost invariably to the obvious conclusion that economic growth depends on a combination of savings and capital accumulation, education and incorporation of technical progress to production, adequate institutions, motivated and thriving entrepreneurs, competent state policies, etc.
The model that I will present here is not concerned with the causes of economic growth, but, starting from the fact that growth is taking place, it searches to understand which are its central economic characteristics -particularly how the functional distribution of income varies historically. Once the capitalist and national revolutions take place, and economic development gets started, the increase in labor and overall productivity becomes ingrained in the economic process, and it is possible to discriminate its main interrelated characteristics. Specifically it is possible to connect historically the types of technological progress with the wage rate and the profit rate, and, so, with functional distribution of income. neoclassical economics, it does not explain aggregate economic behaviors with the microfoundations's logic, but adopts a historical-deductive approach based in new historical facts to explain change. It does need not to criticize Say's law and introduce demand in it because it is not interested in explaining cyclical crises, nor is concerned with the rate of growth. The growth rate is certainly dependent on a tight relation between aggregate demand and production -thus a Keynesian approach is essential when we are interested in understanding the growth rate -, but it is not essential when we deal with distribution. It is a revised model because it starts from the inversion of the classical theory distribution. While in the classical model wages are the constant, and the profit rate, the residuum, in this model the profit rate is the economic and institutional constant, and the wage rate, the residuum. After arguing for the reasonableness of this inversion in the first section of the paper, in the second section I will present three types of technical progresses. In the third section I will shortly discuss the abstract relationships among the model's main variable -what enables me to present in the fourth section this historical stages according to these variables, among which the determining one is the type of technical progress. (Bresser-Pereira, 1984) . This paper summarizes the model and the argument presented in that book. It is the first time that it is presented in English.
Since I am not looking for the causes of economic growth, but for stylized facts which characterize growth, I can assume that the economy is growing, i.e., that income per capita and the productivity rate are increasing. The productivity rate is Y/L = y, and income per capita, Y/N= n, where L is the labor force and N the population. Since L is supposed to grow at the same rate as the population, N, the growth of the productivity and the rate of growth of income per capita are equal. The variation of y (now representing income per capita and the productivity rate) through time is 
The model does not describe any specific capitalist economy, but has as reference the first developed national states, particularly Britain. In the model, as in Kaldor (1956) , the long term profit rate is assumed to be constant, except in one specific historical phase -Liberal Capitalism (1815/25 -1875/95) -, in which it is falling from a high level, which prevailed during the 'industrial revolution', to a 'reasonable' level since then. The classical model of Smith, Ricardo and Marx assumed the wage rate constant, corresponding to the cost of reproducing of the labor force. This cost could change historically, but this assumption is inconsistent with the extent that the real wage rate increased in the more developed countries since mid nineteenth century. On the other hand, the classical economists, using different arguments but all involving a fall in productivity, predicted that the profit rate would decline in the long run. This prediction as well proved to be false. Since mid nineteenth century the profit rate remained basically constant, at a 'reasonable' level, i.e., the level that capitalists require to borrow and invest, or that they invest from their retained profits. It varied strongly according to economic cycles, and responds to exogenous shocks, but in the long run it remained constant.
Why does it make sense to assume a constant rate of profit? Essentially it does because, on one hand, a satisfying profit rate is a condition for the capitalist economic system, and because, on the other, there is not an economic alternative to capitalism, or, more broadly -if one wants to include market socialism -to market economy. For some time it was thought that a command economy could be the alternative, but even whilst this belief was alive it was a distant belief. Given this lack of alternative, capitalist societies will have to preserve the profit rate. The capitalist system can only survive if a reasonable profit rate is assured to active capitalists or entrepreneurs -a rate above the interest rate received by rentiers. On the other hand, although a capitalist economy is characterized by conflict, unless it is in a short run break down process -a political crisis -, in the realm of each national state it is also, and essentially, a cooperative undertaking. The existence of nation presupposes a broad political agreement. Capitalists fight for profits, but they know well that there is a minimum wage rate below which it is impossible to go -the classical subsistence level.
Correspondingly, workers are asking permanently for higher wages, but they know that their wages cannot reduce the profit rate below a given level if capital accumulation and growth are expected.
Since classical economists believed that the productivity of labor would decline in the long run, 2 their bottom line was the wage rate. Yet, as this prediction failed to be true, the alternative bottom line is the profit rate to be constant. While the constant wage rate proved a false prediction, and a third alternative -the profit rate increasing in the long run -makes no sense in a competitive economy, wages increasing in real terms in the long run does make sense. Theoretically the wage rate may increase up to time that the economy achieves abundance, i.e., up to the point that people have the freedom to chose more leisure to more income. As the economy grows, the average wage rate will increase till the bottom line represented by the reasonable or Simon's 'satisficing' profit rate (1957) . From this point on, the economy will be experiencing crisis, which will only be overcome if the profit rate is reestablished. Since economic agents need that the economy works, they either take the required policy and institutional measures to reduce the wage rate or to increase aggregate demand, or they wait that the market system processes the crisis and reestablishes the profit rate.
In Marx's theory, the possibility that the counter-tendencies to the fall of the rate of profit would effectively neutralize the more general tendency was not discarded. In the theory that I am presenting, the neutralization of the business cycle and particularly of the long wave is based on the institutional defense of the rate of profit by the capitalist class. Even if there was an economic alternative to capitalism, this defense would be fierce. Since there is not such alternative, capitalist eventually obtain the cooperation of the other social classes in the institutional process of protecting the rate of profit and the process of capital accumulation.
Besides the market mechanisms that, till a certain extent, assure the way out of the cyclical crisis, the state is supposed to provide the institutional reforms and policies that will assure that this outcome is achieved.
Types of technical progress
Technical progress is defined by the increase of the productivity of labor. There is technical progress when productivity is increasing, or, what is the same, when workers are being able to increase their individual value added. We have three types of technical progress, which are defined by the behavior of the productivity of capital, or the output-capital relation, Y/K, which will be assumed to be equal to the marginal output/capital relation, ∆Y/∆K.
2 Not all classical economists predicted the long run stagnation prospect, but this is clear in Ricardo, Malthus, and Marx.
If the productivity of capital is decreasing, i.e., if Y 2 /K 2 < Y 1 /K 1 (where i indicates time), technical progress will be capital-using, or we will have 'mechanization'. If the product-capital relation is constant, technical progress will be neutral. And if the productivity of capital is increasing, technical progress will be capital-saving.
In the case of capital-using technical progress, income will be increasing at a smaller rate than capital:
In the case of neutral technical progress, where Y 2 /K 2 = Y 1 /K 1 , income will be increasing at the same rate as capital:
In the case of capital-saving technical progress, where Y 2 /K 2 > Y 1 /K 1 , income will be increasing at a higher rate than capital:
Capital-using technical progress is typical of the early stages of industrialization and capital formation. Whenever the costs involved in buying and operating a machine are smaller than the use of man-power, it will be rational for the capitalist to invest in this machine. The production costs will be reduced in so far as the business enterprise substitutes capital for labor, and, as a consequence, the total productivity of labor (i.e., the productivity of labor in the business enterprise making the investment plus the productivity in making the machine)
increases. Yet, the machines available have different productivities. Entrepreneurs will, first, invest in the more efficient machine, which replaces one kind of labor; second, they will buy the second best machine, which replaces another type of labor; and so on up to the point where breakeven is achieved. In this process, as different kinds of labor are being replaced by different kinds of machines with decreasing productivity, each new machine being less efficient than the previous one in replacing new forms of labor, the output/capital relation or the productivity of capital will be declining, although production cost is going down. It is true that, in a given moment, a new machine replacing a type of labor which had not yet been mechanized, may be invented and disposed to investors, and this machine may be relatively more efficient than the ones which had previously replaced other forms of labor. In this case, mechanization will not cause the fall of the productivity of capital. Yet, this situation will be rather the exception than the rule. The tendency is that the inventions and specially innovations (the actual adoption of the invention) take place in sequence in such a way that the first innovations have high capital/output ratios and the following, increasingly smaller ones. In this case, technical progress will be necessarily capital-using, the output-capital relation will be declining.
While capital-using technical progress involves the substitution of capital for different activities performed by labor, capital saving technical progress derives from the substitution of new machines for old ones of the same type (i.e., which replace the same kind of labor, or performs the same kind of operation that a previous one performed). It is only the 'model' of the machine that changes, since it replaces the same type of labor. The new model, however, is cheaper, or more efficient. In this second case, technical progress besides saving labor saves capital itself, increasing the output-capital relation. While in the case of mechanization the business enterprise had no other alternative than to invest in increasingly less efficient machines, in this case it again will not have other alternative but in investing in increasingly more productive or less expensive machines -machines that are able to turn out a larger output (with the same quality) per unit of capital. New machines, in this case, are new in relation to other models of machine performing the same operation, while new machines in the first case are machines performing new operations and thus replacing new types of labor.
New machines will only appear in the market as they bring some innovation and lower costs, but there is a major difference between new machines performing new operations which were previously manual, and new machines replacing old machines. In one case we have capitalsaving technical progress, in the other, capital-using technical progress.
There is not a specific form of substitution of capital for labor in the case of neutral technical progress. This sort of technical progress just exists in so far as the two previous processes compensate one another. At every moment we will have new types of labor being replaced by new types of machines, and old machines being replaced by new models of the same machines ('same' just in so far it replaces the same type of labor). In the first case, technical progress will be capital-using, in the second, capital-saving. If the negative effect of the first is compensated by the positive of the second, technical progress will be neutral.
The abstract relationships
Given these three forms of technical progress, or the variation of the output/capital ratio (which Marx called the 'technical composition of capital'), we will have different behaviors of the other central economic variables: the profit rate, the wage rate, and the functional distribution of income. These variables are related among themselves following a simple identity:
Let us suppose, first, that the functional distribution of income between profits and wages is constant: R/Y→. In this case, and just having in mind that an increasing capitaloutput ratio means a decreasing output-capital ratio, it is easy to see, from identity (1), that, if technical progress is capital-using (declining output-capital ratio, Y/K↓), the profit rate will be declining, R/K↓; if technical progress is neutral (constant output-capital ratio, Y/K→), the profit rate will be constant, R/K→; and if technical progress is capital-saving (increasing output-capital ratio, Y/K↑), the profit rate will be increasing, R/K↑.
In the case of capital-using technical progress, how can we explain that rational businessmen will invest in machines or processes which will reduce their profits, unless the new technology comes together with income concentration (a condition which will not necessarily occur)? This is the classical problem posed by the Okishio theorem (1961, 1967) .
I already answered part of this question when I showed that the entrepreneur, faced with capital-using techniques, will be constrained to adopt them, given the fact that they involve smaller costs. Thus, to avoid being thrown out of the market, or seeing its profit rate disappear, the entrepreneur will adopt the capital-using technique. To this argument it is necessary to add the reasoning that, once all business enterprises replaced manpower for a given relatively (to the previous ones) less productive machine, the resulting output-capital ratio for the whole industry will be smaller, and the rate of profit will be smaller than it was previously. This is a perverse but rational effect of the adoption of capital using technical progress.
3
What happens with the wage rate, given the three forms of technical progress? To answer this question simply, instead of starting from Marx's concept of organic composition of capital, R/W, which does not take directly into consideration the type of technical progress, I return to equation (1)and re-write it substituting W+L for Y:
From this equation, and assuming that the profit rate is constant (R/K→) and that technical progress is neutral (Y/K→), the functional distribution of income (R/W)≈ [R/(R+W)] will be constant (R/W→). 4 Thus, if Y is growing, R, W, and K will be growing at the same rate:
Now, dividing Y and W by L, and W/L, we have the rate of productivity (Y/L=y) and the wage rate (W/L=w). If the total income and total wages are increasing at the same rate, this means that the increase of the productivity rate (which is equal to per capita growth of income, y & , given the assumption that L and N are growing at the same rate), is equal to the growth of the wage rate, w & :
The other relationships may be easily deduced from the previous reasoning. In Table 1 I will just depict the main relations assuming that, through time, the functional distribution of income is constant (which is Marx's reasonable historical assumption), and that the profit rate (not the wage rate) is also constant, while income per capita is increasing. 
Historical stages
In the previous section I presented some abstract relations among the main economic variables describing capitalist economic development. These relations, however, will only make sense if we take them in the historical phases or stages of capitalist growth. In this paper, I will distinguish just four stages: Technicians' Capitalism 1945 -… I acknowledge that this is a 'heroic' simplification of history, but a simplified history is better than no history -than models that ignore history. This is not the moment to review and argue for this phases -something that did in my original work on the subject (BresserPereira, 1984) . The Industrial Revolution is a well known process. It is the moment in which the capitalist revolution, which began with the Commercial Revolution, comes to an end. It is the moment when, in Rostow's terms (1960) , the 'take-off' takes place. In the Commercial
Revolution primitive accumulation -the initial accumulation of capital through the use of some form of violence -created the conditions for the subsequent generalization of wage labor and the competitive appropriation of surplus through profits (Marx, 1867: I,24) . With the Industrial Revolution -a concentrated process of industrialization involving positive externalities or spillovers, and, consequently, high profit rates -, capitalist development becomes self-sustained in so far as the reinvestment of profits to keep pace of technological progress becomes a condition of survival of the business enterprises.
In this search for stylized facts, the Industrial Revolution, which I broadly located for
Britain between 1750 and 1815, will be characterized by a high and constant profit rate, while technical progress will be dominantly capital-using. This is consistent with a declining wage rate, and with the concentration of the functional distribution of income. The wage rate may be declining because it is assumed that workers, immediately before the Industrial Revolution, had a higher standard of living: the first moment of industrialization represented for them 'proletarization' or pauperization. Thus, in this phase, we have:
The following phase is Liberal Capitalism or Competitive Capitalism. The transition from pre-capitalism was completed, and the new economic system is in process of consolidation. The economy is characterized by a large number of small and medium sized family enterprises. It is essentially competitive, since the gigantic business enterprises are not yet present. The economic system corresponds to the one predicted and describe by the classical liberal economists. It is the capitalism that Marx experienced, and describes better than anyone else. This phase could also be called the 'Marxian phase', because in it the basic trends devised by Marx are present. It is the only phase in which I accept that the profit rate is the dependent variable. Technical progress remains capital using since mechanizations continues intense; the surplus value or functional distribution of income is constant; the profit rate is declining from the high level of the previous phase, while the wage rate is constant at the cost of reproduction of the working force level.
Liberal Capitalism Y/K→ R/K↓ W/L→ R/W↑
By the second part of the nineteenth century, around 1870, we have major changes which bring Classical Capitalism: mass production techniques are introduced, the explosion motor replaces the steam motor, and electrical power is dominated and diffused (the Second Industrial Revolution). As a consequence, the economic system turns relatively less competitive, in so far as large business enterprises start dominating the scene, and in so far as workers get organized in unions. Both changes were interdependent: the higher level of workers' organization was only possible in view of the relative oligopolization of markets.
From this, follows a major consequence: workers became capable of retaining the productivity gains. Economic theory based on competition assumed that productivity increases would just led to lower costs which would benefit all, including foreign consumers.
The new workers' organization capacity turns possible what, in the late 1950s, would be the 'Prebisch's these': while industrial countries which had organized labor were able to conserve productivity gains, disorganized workers producing primary products in developing countries
were not, from that deriving the deterioration of the terms of exchange. For our model, only the first aspect of the problem is important. With the Second Industrial Revolution, these characteristics are just enhanced. Markets are increasingly oligopolist, but business enterprises remain competitive enough to keep centrally concerned with the incorporation of technical progress. In so far as mechanization and capital-savings technology compensate one another, the output/capital ratio is basically constant (as growth models usually assume), technical progress is neutral. From this moment on, workers would be able to augment their wages according to the productivity rate without threatening the profit rate. Capitalism achieves its classical moment. The great agreement between capitalists and workers, which would assure a relative social peace in developed industrial countries, begins. Technical progress is neutral, the profit rate is constant, and the functional distribution of income, constant; as a consequence, the wage rate increases with productivity. globalization. These new facts cause a major change in the capitalist system: capital ceases gradually to be the strategic factor of production, as it is replaced by technical and organizational knowledge (Galbraith, 1967; Bresser-Pereira, 1972 , 1981 (Glyn et al., 1988; Marglin, 1990) , and, although I am including it in the new phase, it may also be viewed as a transition period. The profit rate keeps high, while wages and particularly salaries are increasing fast. Fast enough to cause, in the 1960s, a profit squeeze, and the fall in the rate of profit (Boddy and Crotty, 1975; Goldenstein, 1999) . The neo-liberal ideological wave and the institutional market oriented reforms that began in the following decade are a reaction of the system to restore the satisfying profit rate -something that is achieved in the 1990s (Wolff, 2001; Brenner, 2002; Duménil and Lévy, 2002) as the demand for technical labor increased strongly with the information technology revolution, while the demand for non-technical labor lagged behind, personal concentration of income was inevitable. On the other hand, as the top professional class assumed increasingly the direction of major business enterprises, and capitalists were increasingly reduced to the condition of rentiers or inactive capitalists, they accepted that the profit rate went down a bit (the dent in Figure 1 reflecting this fall), to stabilize at a new constant lower level, the difference being appropriated by salaries, particularly by top executives' high salaries.
Classical Capitalism
After the transition, the basic relations in Technicians' Capitalism show the same trends that in Classical Capitalism, since technical progress will continue to be defined by a constant output/capital ratio, while the profit rate and the functional distribution of income remain constant, and the wage rate increases again at the rate of increase in productivity. 
The rate of growth
As I remarked in the beginning of the paper, these models do not deal with the factor that cause a higher or a smaller rate of growth. This is only partially true. Each of the three forms of technical progress implies a rate of growth, in so far as the output/capital ratio measures the productivity of capital. Given the same investment rate, growth will be higher if technical progress is capital-saving than if it is neutral, and still higher if it is capital-using. Yet, the model does not say which will be this rate, because the increase in the labor productivity does not depend only on the type of technical progress, it also depends on the 'intensity' of technical progress. And, naturally, it is also dependent on the rate of savings and capital accumulation. On its turn, the intensity of technical progress depends on a large number of
variables, as education, entrepreneurial capacity, labor and entrepreneurial motivation, rational allocation of resources, institutions adequate to growth, competent and growth oriented economic policies, etc. These are the microeconomic reforms, in which dynamic capitalist economies are supposed to be permanently involved.
Yet, economic growth depends on a fourth factor, in addition to the rate of capital accumulation, the type, and the intensity of technical progress: it depends on reasonable full employment of labor and capacity. Since economic growth is the long term sum or the integral of short term GDP per capita growth rates, the growth achieved every year is important. In some moments, it is required to sacrifice the short term for the long term, and get involved in economic adjustment, but when a country does this, it expects that the growth rate through time will be higher. Full employment, on its hand, depends on competent macroeconomic policies managing the economic cycle.
What does this long term historical model of growth say in relation to administration of the business cycle? It says essentially one thing. When an economy faces crises, this means that the expected profit rate fell down, the investments were reduced. Thus, the solution will necessarily involve the restoration of the profit rate. Yet, we can have at least two types of crisis: a slow down or normal recession, or a major and long term crisis. In the first case, restoring the rate of profit will involve monetary and fiscal policy. However, if the crisis is structural, related to large foreign indebtedness, as has been in most Latin American countries since 1980, the solution will probably involve reducing salaries through exchange rate devaluation. Thus, keeping the profit rate constant at a reasonable level is not just a long term sensible assumption; it also may indicate which should be the required macroeconomic policy to stimulate investment and resume economic growth when the crisis threatens in the long run the profit rate prospects.
Conclusion
The revised classical model of growth that I just presented is a historical model.
Concomitantly, it is an abstract and general growth model, where the stylized facts about economic growth and distribution appear clearly. It assumes an investment function: capital accumulation depends on the expected rate of profit. It also assumes a production function:
growth depends on investments, and on the type and intensity of technical progress. It also depends on full employment, since the production function defines the potential output; the actual product will also depend on effective demand, or on reducing the output hiatus.
The model aims at be simple and general without losing a historical perspective. Thus, it assumes a closed economy, competition, and the existence of only two economic agents:
capitalists and workers. The state is present in the model not as an economic agent collecting taxes and providing economic transferences, but only defining the institutions required for markets to operate and the profit rate to be assured at a satisfying level. Given the existence of three types of technological progress (capital using or mechanization, neutral, and capital saving), I show how -in the process of economic growth or increase of labor productivitythe profit rate, the wage rate, the plus value rate, the organic composition of capital, and the technical composition of capital vary in relation to these three types. In the model, technological progress is defined by the increase of labor productivity (which corresponds to the increase of income per capita, if one assumes as constant the active/inactive labor force relation). Technological progress will be capital-using if the increase in labor productivity entails the reduction of the output-capital ratio. It will be neutral, if economic growth takes place with a constant output-capital ratio; and it will be capital-saving if this ratio increases.
Although using Marx's concepts, the analysis comes to the conclusion that the falling tendency of the rate of profit hypothesis was only valid if and while the capital-using technological progress is dominant. Once this assumption is dropped, and technological progress is assumed to be neutral, the profit rate will remain constant, while the wage rate will increase according to the growth of labor productivity. In the case that capital-saving technology becomes dominant the wage-rate could increase more than the productivity rate, while the profit rate would remain constant.
The assumption of a constant rate of profit is based on two other assumptions: that there is no alternative form of economic organization to capitalism, and that capital accumulation and growth depend on a satisfying profit rate. Thus, the profit rate plays a central role in the model. Whenever appear a tendency to the fall of the rate of profit (as it happen between the late 1960s and the 1980s), the economic and political system reacts in order to restore it.
From this model, and from basic factual knowledge on the history of modern capitalism, it is possible to derive the stylized facts of capitalist growth. Britain and, more generally, the countries that first completed the capitalist revolution are taken for reference.
Economic growth turned out in four phases: the industrial revolution, from late eighteenth century to around 1915; Competitive or Liberal Capitalism, from 1815 to around 1870;
Classical Capitalism, from 1890 to 1945/70; and Technicians' Capitalism, from 1970 till presently. In the four phases, increase in labor productivity is taking place. The model does not discuss this rate. It assumes that it will depend on the rate of capital accumulation, the intensity of technological progress, and the effective use of capital and labor inputs. From the assumption historically verified that economic growth is happening, it looks for the stylized facts involved in this growth process. In the first phase (the industrial revolution), the only important supposition is that the profit rate is high. Given this assumption, in the second phase (competitive capitalism) the profit may decline without threatening to paralyze the process of capital accumulation. Technological progress is capital-using, and the functional distribution of income (or surplus value rate) is constant, as the wage rate is reduced to the cost of reproduction of the labor force level, and the rate of profit is declining. This is 'the Marxian period': the variables behave essentially as Marx supposed they would. In the third period (classical capitalism), we have a kind of long term steady state. Technical progress becomes neutral, the functional distribution of income between profits and wages is constant, the profit rate constant, and the wage rate increases with productivity. Finally, with technobureaucratic capitalism, technical progress is capital-saving. The functional distribution declines, as the profit rate remains constant, while wages (which now, given the rise of the professional middle class, includes salaries), increase at a higher rate of productivity. To be more precise, the wage rate stricto senso remains constant, but the salary rate increases substantially. On the other hand, given the fact that now the profit rate remunerates principally rentiers or inactive capitalists, and the entrepreneurial activity is also paid with high salaries received by top managers, the satisfying profit rate (consistent with capital accumulation) is somewhat smaller than in the competitive and in the classical period, becoming again constant at this lower level.
